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Thank you to the Washington Space Business Roundtable for inviting me to participate in today's discussion. It is a privilege to appear alongside Chris Davenport and Dean Cheng. I will briefly raise three topics.

First is **the need to better understand the multifaceted nature of the China threat and the stakes and consequences of the ongoing competition**. Beijing continues to acquire, field and operate a wide range of capabilities to challenge U.S. operations and interests in near-Earth and cislunar space – the region beyond GEO to the Moon. Today the U.S. has some significant advantages, but they will likely erode over time as China continues to invest heavily in capabilities to achieve the goal of becoming the dominant power in space by its centennial anniversary, if not sooner.

The PLA is conducting increasingly sophisticated and provocative space operations that include close approaches to high-value U.S. satellites. The PLA operates a wide variety of space and counterspace systems designed to contest U.S. and allied freedom of action in space and jeopardize our military forces. And China's expanding "kill web" of Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance satellites tied to long-range precision strike systems could significantly degrade our ability to support longstanding defense commitments to allies throughout the IndoPacific theater.

China's actions in the South China Sea provides a clear indication of their likely future behavior in all regions of space. Here, Beijing is refusing to comply with binding international judicial rulings, laying claim to contested territory and resources, and conducting increasingly dangerous and provocative military operations to coerce governments in the region to accede to the CCP's political and territorial demands.

China's pursuit of a dominant position in cislunar space would strengthen the economic element of its national power and weaken the United States and its allies. In this regard, the PRC could establish an Exclusive Economic Zone in cislunar space, declare a Space Defense Identification Zone and "keep out" zones to protect it, conduct resource utilization to support operations on the lunar surface, and extract valuable resources on the Moon to increase its international competitiveness, wealth, and military power. In addition, the CCP could move to monopolize the market for rare minerals on the Moon as well as the use of lunar water as an energy source.

China might attempt to enforce such astropolitical claims by purposefully interfering with the operations of U.S. and other nations' spacecraft in cislunar space. This could take the form of rendezvous and proximity operations to inspect or harass foreign spacecraft, coating or dazzling sensors, blocking or jamming communications links, grappling satellites and moving them to another orbit, and employing counterspace weapons to deny or disrupt satellites with non-kinetic weapon effects or possibly degrade or destroy spacecraft with kinetic attacks. We must prepare for these developments.

Second, **the U.S. Government must do a better job of leveraging the remarkable expansion and transformation of the U.S. commercial space enterprise that has taken place over the past decade.** The exponential increase in private investment in commercial space companies is breathtaking. A recent report from Seraphim Space, a venture capital firm, assessed that nearly \$3.5 billion in investment went to the space industry in the third quarter of 2025 – an all-time high.

National policy directs Federal depts & agencies to use commercial goods and services to the maximum extent practicable – except for certain national security, foreign policy, or public safety roles – and not compete with the commercial space sector.

I watched a recent Roundtable interview with Kevin Coggins from NASA. He clearly understands the value of leveraging private capital investments in U.S. space companies as well as the funding provided by State organizations such as the Texas Space Commission and others. NASA has made important strides in this regard, specifically in programs such as Commercial Launch Services, Lunar Data Network, Near Space Network, and Commercial Lunar Payload Services.

U.S. national security space organizations, such as the NRO and the US Space Force, are deploying proliferated space constellations that leverage commercial space investments. Over the past two years, NRO has launched more than 200 satellites, creating what it calls “the largest and most capable Government constellation on orbit”. (By contrast, SpaceX has deployed over 10,000 Starlink satellites.) For its part, the U.S. Space Force is pursuing a variety of commercial space capabilities for national defense including elements of the Space Development Agency's Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture. Still, the War Department and the Intelligence Community can and should do more in terms of leveraging the innovative offerings and speed-to-market of the U.S. commercial space sector.

Third, now is the time to **optimize intergovernmental partnerships in support of bold U.S. space goals.** In this regard, the Trump administration should strengthen and expand coordination among the U.S. civil, defense and intelligence sectors.

Key areas of cross-agency collaboration include:

- Launch services: The Air Force, Space Force, NASA and NRO have long worked together to certify launch vehicles, a collaboration that continues today.

- Lunar missions: These same agencies have collaborated on lunar spacecraft, dating back to the Apollo program.
- Satellite technology: These agencies also have a long history of collaborating on advanced satellite technology, including development of high-resolution camera systems for NASA's Apollo program.
- Strategic planning and threat assessment: Agencies work together to develop enterprise solutions for scientific and technological challenges, including collaborating on space situational awareness, protecting national assets in space, and identifying synergistic science and technology solutions.
- Talent sharing: Programs exist to share personnel, which helps foster collaboration and build a shared understanding of their respective missions.

President Trump should direct the Secretary of War, NASA Administrator, Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Commerce and others to produce an intersector strategy to promote U.S. national interests in the Earth-Moon system and beyond. Such a strategy should acknowledge that the Moon and Mars, Lagrange points, and supporting passageways have intrinsic national security, economic and political value and will serve as the infrastructure pathway to the Moon and Mars. It should also direct rapidly fielding of a robust set of space domain awareness capabilities, PNT systems, a space-based communications network for all regions of space, and other capabilities as well as expanded collaboration across the civil, defense and intelligence agencies.

Likewise, the U.S. Congress should increase funding for civil and national security space programs and direct that NASA, DOW, and the IC expand collaboration and fully leverage commercial space capabilities and private capital investments.

Implementation of these three recommendations – **countering the China threat in all regions of space, leveraging private capital across the civil and national security space sectors, and enhancing intersector collaboration** – will provide a firm foundation upon which to sustain America's position as the world's leader in the exploration and use of outer space for mankind's advancement. Thank you very much.